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# SMART HOME SYSTEM SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT

The concept of the Internet of Things became the basis of the fourth industrial revolution, which allowed to transfer the processes of automation to a new saber. As a result, automation systems, such as smart homes, healthcare systems and car control systems, have become widespread. The developers of such systems primarily focus their efforts on the functional component, leaving safety issues in the background. However, when designing and operating IoT systems, it is equally important to assess potential bottlenecks and develop complete and comprehensive strategies to mitigate and eliminate the negative effects of cyberattacks.

The purpose of this study is to identify possible cyber threats and assess their impact on critical information objects in the smart home system. To achieve this goal, the three-level architecture of the smart home system is considered and a review of known cyber threats for each level is conducted. The critical information objects in the smart home system are the containers in which the information objects are stored, the risk assessment criteria and the cyber threat scenarios. The information security risks of the smart home system were assessed using the OCTAVE Allegro methodology for the information object that presents the information collected by the smart home sensors.

Keywords: security risk assessment, smart home, critical information object, threats

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# ОЦІНКА РИЗИКІВ БЕЗПЕКИ СИСТЕМИ РОЗУМНОГО БУДИНКУ

Концепція Інтернету речей стала основою четвертої промислової революції, що дозолило перевести на новий шабель процеси автоматизації. Наслідком цього стало широке поширення систем автоматизації зокрема, розумних будинків, систем у сфері охорони здоров'я та систем керування автомобілем. Розробники таких систем в першу чергу фокусують власні зусилля на функціональній складовій, залишаючи питання безпеки на другий план. Проте, при проектуванні та експлуатації систем Інтернету речей не менш важливим завданням є оцінка потенційних "вузьких" місць та розроблення повних та вичерпних стратегій по пом'якшенню та усуненню негативних впливів кібератак.

Метою даного дослідження є визначення можливих кіберзагроз та оцінка їх впливів на критичні інформаційні об'єкти в системі розумного будинку. Для досягнення мети у роботі розглянуто трьохрівневу архітектуру системи розумного будинку та проведено огляд відомих кіберзагроз для кожного рівня. Визначено критичні інформаційні об'єкти в системі розумного будинку контейнери, в яких зберігаються інформаційні об'єкти, критерії оцінки ризиків та сценарії кіберзагроз. Проведено оцінку ризиків інформаційної безпеки системи розумного будинку із залученням методології OCTAVE Allegro для інформаційного об'єкту, що представляє інформацію, зібрану датчиками розумного будинку. Проведений процес оцінки ризиків дозволяє проаналізувати інформаційні об'єкти в системі розумного будинку, які є критичними з точки зору безпеки, провести аналіз ризиків та їх впливів на об'єкти, та запропонувати можливі контрзаходи з метою захисту інформаційних об'єктів та створення системи розумного дому більш безпечним.

Перспективним напрямком подальших досліджень є формування комплексної оцінки ризиків інформаційної безпеки системи розумного будинку та реалізації програмної системи, що дозволить автоматизувати процес формування оцінки ризиків не тільки для системи розумного будинку, а й для інших систем, що імплементують принцип Інтернету речей. Ключові слова: оцінка ризиків безпеки, розумний будинок, критичний інформаційний об'єкт, загрози.

#### Introduction

The growing popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT) provides ample opportunities to improve, plan and automate our lives. IoT allows you to network and manage multiple devices that provide data collection, analysis and transmission. The scope of IoT continues to expand every year, covering new areas of life, from smart homes, cities to healthcare.

However, along with the obvious benefits and conveniences of using IoT, the concept of the Internet of Things leaves a number of potential security bottlenecks for attackers. Users' personal data collected by smart devices is always of value to hackers and hijackers of confidential information. In addition, a cyberattack on an Internet of Things solution has the potential to damage physical services and physical infrastructure. When designing and operating Internet of Things systems, an important task is to assess these potential bottlenecks and develop complete and comprehensive strategies to mitigate and eliminate the negative effects of cyberattacks. Therefore, *the purpose of this study* is to identify possible cyber threats and assess their impact on critical information objects in the smart home system.

#### The architecture of the Internet of Things system, and in particular the smart home, can be represented through three logical levels (fig. 1): the level of perception, the network level and the level of applications [1, 2]. Let's take a closer look at each level of the smart home system and analyze known cyber threats that violate the integrity, availability and confidentiality of information at the appropriate level. Network level Fog Cloud Smart hub/ Data Data controller base base Network interface Web User S S Router Servers Servers server interface **‡**) Load User Mesh network balancer device Perception level Application level Security Low High

Fig. 1. Three-level architecture of smart home

## Perception level

The closest level to the physical environment in the architecture of a smart home is the level of perception. The main functions of this level are the collection of information about the state of the physical environment and the implementation of mechanisms for influencing it. The assigned functions are implemented using multiple sensors and actuators, respectively. The information collected by the sensors depends on the nature of the physical environment and may relate to location, changes in the air and environment, movement, vibration, and so on. Actuators implement the principle of conversion of electrical energy transmitted through conductors into other types of energy. Examples of actuators are various types of motors, relay modules and automated cranes. The security of this level in the smart home system is the lowest, which «attracts» attackers to carry out attacks on the smart home device. The most common security threats to this level of perception are:

Eavesdropping. Eavesdropping is an unauthorized attack that violates the privacy of real-time information in which an attacker intercepts private messages, such as phone calls, text messages, fax transmissions, or video conferencing. Ehe main purpose of the eavesdropping attack is to violate the confidentiality of information. An unsecured data channel is used to access the information that is sent and received.

Fake node. This is an attack in which an attacker adds a new node to the system and fills the network with fake data. The main purpose of this attack is to stop the transmission of information from real network nodes. A node added by an attacker consumes the energy of real nodes and potentially controls it to destroy the network.

Node Capture. In this attack, an attacker gains full control of a key node, such as a gateway node. It can transmit all information, including the connection between the sender and the recipient, the key used to ensure secure communication and the information stored in memory.

Timing attacks: This is a type of passive attack aimed at devices with limited computing resources. During the attack, an attacker discovers vulnerabilities and obtains secrets that are stored in the security of the system, tracking how long it takes the system to respond to various requests.

Replay attack. This is an attack in which an attacker eavesdrops on security between the sender and the recipient and takes authentic information from the sender. The attacker sends the victim the same authenticated information that was already received during his communication, demonstrating proof of his identity and authenticity. The message is encrypted, so the recipient can consider it as a valid request and take the actions desired by the attacker.

#### Network level

The network layer performs a transport function for transmitting information within a smart home and is a bridge between the level of perception and the level of applications. It transmits information collected from physical objects using sensors. It also takes responsibility for connecting smart things, network devices and networks to each other. The presence of a communication component makes this level sensitive to attacks by attackers. It has noticeable [3, 4] security issues regarding the integrity and authentication of information transmitted over the network. Common security threats and problems for network layers are [5, 6]:

Expoloit: A type of attack that is implemented using a piece of software code or a sequence of commands that exploit vulnerabilities in software. The purpose of the attack can be both to seize control of the system and to disrupt its operation.

Three-level architecture of home automation systems and attacks on its components

«Man in the middle» attack: A Man in the middle is a cyberattack where the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communications between two parties who believe that they are directly communicating with each other. One example of a MItM attack is active eavesdropping, in which the attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages between them to make them believe they are talking directly to each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker.

Denial of Service (DoS) attack: This is an attack whose primary purpose is to prevent legitimate users from accessing devices or other network resources. This is usually accomplished by filling the target devices or network resources with redundant requests in order to prevent or complicate the use of some or all legitimate users.

Data Warehouse Attack: User information is stored on storage devices or in the cloud. An attacker could attack both storage devices and the cloud, and user information could be changed to incorrect information, thereby violating the integrity and confidentiality of data.

#### Application level

The application layer is the highest level in the logical smart home hierarchy and defines all applications that use smart home technology or in which smart home is deployed. Its main purpose is to provide services to applications. Services may be different for each program, as services depend on the information collected by the sensors. At the application level, there are many issues where security is a key issue. In particular, when the Internet of Things is used to create a smart home, it creates many threats and vulnerabilities inside and out. One of the main problems in implementing smart security in a smart home based on the Internet of Things is that the devices used in smart homes have low computing power and low memory. Common security threats and application level problems are [1, 7]:

Malicious code attack: This is code in any part of the software, the main purpose of which is to violate the confidentiality, availability and integrity of information, as well as damage to the system. Malicious software can implement its own code into the body of a user application, or exist separately in memory as a standalone software code, etc.

Cross-site scripting: This is an injection attack that allows an attacker to insert a client-side malicious code script, such as a web page viewed by other users. A cross-site scripting vulnerability may be used by attackers to bypass access controls such as the same-origin policy. By performing such actions, an attacker can completely change the content of the program according to their needs and use the original information in an illegal way.

### Smart home system security risk assessment

An important task in the design and operation of smart home systems is to identify cyber threats, assess their impact on potentially "bottlenecks" in the system and develop complete and comprehensive strategies to mitigate and eliminate the negative effects of cyberattacks. Moreover, the sooner the assessment is carried out and appropriate measures are taken, the greater the likelihood of ensuring the integrity, accessibility and confidentiality of information. Consider the process of assessing the risks of information security of the smart home system. To assess the risks, we use the OCTAVE Allegro methodology [9].

OCTAVE Allegro is a methodology that allows you to streamline and optimize the process of assessing information security risks, allowing the organization to obtain sufficient results in a small amount of time, human and other limited resources. The main focus of the OCTAVE Allegro methodology is to consider people, technology and tools in the context of their relationship to the information and business processes and services they support.

The OCTAVE Allegro methodology defines eight successive stages, organized in 4 phases (Fig. 2): definition of criteria, profiling of objects, identification of threats, identification and mitigation of risks. With the help of OCTAVE Allegro tables, it is possible to record the results of each assessment step risk and use them as input for the next steps. Individual steps apply to each individual information object. To assess safety risks, we use the OCTAVE Allegro template, which is presented in [9, 10].

During the research, we were inspired by work [10], and presented our own vision of the problem. Consider in more detail the application of the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to assess the security risks of a smart home system.

### Definition of risk assessment criteria

The purpose of this step is to determine what may be the consequence of the risk to the business strategy and objectives or critical success factors (commercial stakeholders) and to the occupants of the smart home (non-commercial stakeholders). This step consists of two sub-step. The first sub-step involves defining a set of qualitative and quantitative measures to assess the impact of risks on the identified critical information objects in the smart home system. In the process of the second activity, the zone of influence is prioritized according to their importance for the owner of the smart home or stakeholders.

Criteria for evaluating the OCTAVE Allegro methodology include the following categories: customer reputation and trust; life, health, safety; fines and legal sanctions; financial losses; productivity.

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


Fig. 2. Steps of the OCTAVE Allegro methodology

Before filling in the OCTAVE Allegro tables, it is necessary to determine who are the stakeholders for whom the risk assessment in the smart home system is carried out. The following stakeholders can be identified for the smart home system: non-commercial stakeholders represented by the end users of the smart home system and commercial stakeholders - software and hardware manufacturers, private and public companies involved in the installation and deployment of home automation systems, etc. Table 1 provides examples of risk assessment criteria, in particular for the categories of life, health, safety and fines and legal sanctions, as well as their priority.

Table 1

	Risk ass	sessment criteria	14010 1	
	Low	Middle	High	
Criterion	Risk assessment criteria - life, health, safety (priority - 5)			
Life (non-commercial stakeholders)	No loss or significant threat to the lives of end users	Users' lives are in danger, but after receiving medical care, they recover	Loss of human life	
Health (non-commercial stakeholders)	The deterioration is minimal and can be treated immediately with recovery within a few days	Temporary deterioration of users' health	Significant violation of the health of users. The recovery period is more than one month. Acquisition of chronic diseases.	
Safety (non-commercial stakeholders)	The safety of the final consumer is in question	Minimal impact on end-user safety. The presence of an administrative offense	End-user safety is compromised. The presence of a criminal offense	
Criterion	Risk assessment criterion - fines and	d legal sanctions (priority - 1)		
Fines (commercial stakeholders)	Collection of fines in the amount of less than UAH 100,000	Collection of fines in the amount of 100 to 300 thousand UAH.	Collection of fines in the amount of more than UAH 300,000.	
Lawsuits (commercial stakeholders)	Registration of lawsuits in the amount of less than UAH 100,000	Registration of lawsuits in the amount of less than 100 to 300 thousand UAH	Registration of lawsuits in the amount of more than 300 thousand UAH.	
Investigations (commercial stakeholders)	No inquiries from the government or other investigative agencies	Request for information from the government or other investigative body	The government or other investigative agency is launching an in-depth investigation against the stakeholders	

Thus, the criterion for assessing the risks to life, health and safety is set at 5 (highest), for reputation - 4, for financial losses - 3, for productivity - 2. The lowest priority is the category of fines and legal sanctions with the appropriate level priority 1.

# Development of a profile of information objects

In this step, critical information objects should be identified and profiled. In the process of profiling, we will define clear boundaries for the object in the smart home system, its safety requirements and identify all places where the object is stored, transported and stored. These steps will identify vulnerabilities in critical information objects.

The first step in the process of developing information object profiles is the actual identification of these objects. It should be noted that the level of applications will not be considered due to its greater security of information objects [8]. For the level of perception and network level of a smart home (Fig. 1), the following critical information objects can be distinguished [2]: information collected by sensors; video surveillance camera data; user credentials

(username and password); information resources (documents, user files); information on setting up a smart home; structure of a smart home (information about devices); information about the event log (information about the state of the smart home); user devices; location information. Table 2 shows the profile of the critical information object «information collected by devices»

# Identification of containers of information objects

After describing the profiles of critical information objects, according to the OCTAVE Allegro methodology, the containers of information objects are identified. An information object container is a place where information is located. Containers can be technical (software, software, servers and communication networks), physical (paper, flash media, CDs) or people (who knows about the information). They can also be both internal and external to the organization. Let's analyze (technical, physical and human) containers for the critical information object «information collected by devices». Table 3 shows the containers of the information object «information collected by devices».

Table 2

(1) Critical object	(2) Justification of the choice	(3) Description
What is a critical	<i>Why is this information important for the organization?</i>	What is the general description of this
information object?	why is this information important for the organization:	information object?
<i>v v</i>		
Information collected by	This information object is an important component in the	This information object determines the
devices	functioning of the smart home system and is the main source of	output from the devices, for example, it
	input data on the state of the environment. Compromise of this	determines what actions the actuators will
	information object may result in system malfunction and risks	perform.
	associated with, for example, fire or flood.	This information determines the safety and
		convenience of the smart home, which are
		the main goals of the smart home system.
(4) <b>Owner</b> (s)		
Who owns this information o	object?	
The owner of this informatic	on object is the smart home system, which has the main responsibili	ty for this information
(5) Security requirements		
What are the security requir	ements for this information object?	
Confidentiality	Only authorized employees can view this information resource:	Only residents of the smart home have
5	5 1 5	access to this information facility. This
		information may also be required by service
		providers for
		provision of appropriate services in
		accordance with contracts
Integrity	Only authorized users can modify this information object:	Only residents have the right to manipulate
Integrity	only autionized users can mounty this mormation object.	this information object.
Accessibility	This information object must be available to these users within	This facility should be ready for use when
Accessionity	24 hours, 7 days a week.	residents or other related systems need it.
	24 nours, 7 days a week.	
		This information facility must be available
		around the clock to ensure the operation of
		the smart home system.
		A short shutdown should not disrupt the
		operation of the system, while a long
		interruption (more than 8 hours) would
		cause significant problems.
(6) The most important saf		
What is the most important s	security requirement for this information object?	
Confidentiality		

# Critical Information Object Profile "Information Collected by Devices (Sensors)"

# Identify areas of concern

In this step the identify problem areas in previously identified information objects is carried out. For each identified information object, specific problems are identified that may adversely affect the security of this object. This step describes the potential impacts, if any, of the threat and the conditions that cause the event. The description, which is based on the storage locations of the information objects defined, provides a detailed understanding of where the information object may start a security breach.

# Identification of cyber threat scenarios

The next step is to build threat scenarios for each identified information object. A threat scenario includes one or more objects, an actor (actor), means, motives, and a list of undesirable outcomes. An actor can be both natural (storm, flood, fire or other disaster), automated (malicious software) and intelligent (criminal, activist or other person who intends to cause school to a smart home). The means is the vulnerability used by the entity against the information object. The motive is the actor's desire to apply the means to the information object. An undesirable result is damage to the information object (it can be disclosure, alteration, interruption or destruction). This step allows to identify threat scenarios that can be implemented to a greater extent. Threats are identified using containers in which object are stored or transferred.

### Containers of the information object "information collected by devices (sensors)"

N₂	Description of the container	Owner
Tech	nical information containers	
Inter	nal	
1	Database: The information resource is located on database servers and web servers	Smart home owner / residents
2	The internal network of a smart home	
3	User's devices	
Exte	rnal	
5	Internet	-
Phys	ical information containers	
Inter	nal	
1	Paper media	Smart home owner / residents
2	Storage devices	
Exte	rnal	
-	-	_
Hun	nan information containers	
Inter	nal	
1	Family members	residents
Exte	rnal	
2	Guests	Guests
3	Service man	Service man

#### **Identification of risks**

Risk is the possibility of causing damage or loss (data, software, hardware) and consists of event, consequence and uncertainty. The threat can have many potential negative consequences for the organization. For example, a breach of an organization's e-commerce system can affect an organization's reputation with customers as well as its financial position. In order to determine the risks for each information object, a threat scenario is applied to its components, provided that the threat scenario is implemented and the impact on the stakeholders of the smart home is assessed.

#### **Risk analysis**

At this stage, the identified risks in step 6 are assessed using the assessment criteria established in the first step. These scores are used to prioritize risks, and as a result, to mitigate the impact of risks on the smart home system. Thus, for each risk of the information object, the following actions should be performed: assign values "high", "medium" and "low" in the field Value (Table 4) taking into account the risk assessment criteria (Table 1); calculate the score for each impact zone by multiplying the impact area priority by the impact value (high = 3, medium = 2, low = 1). After writing the result in the evaluation column, a final evaluation is formed, which is a relative indicator of risk.

## Choice of approaches to mitigate the effects of risks

In the latter, the risks analyzed in the previous step are used to develop a strategy to mitigate the potential impact of risks on the information objects of the smart home system. Thus, in this step, the approach is chosen to deal with each threat according to their priority. There are several approaches to the choice: accept, reduce, transfer, postpone. After identifying the risks and assessing the risks, a mitigation checklist can be defined to avoid or limit the identified risks and the negative consequences arising from them. We perform a risk assessment for the information object «information collected by devices» (Table 4).

These steps of the OCTAVE Allegro methodology are performed for each critical information object. The conducted risk assessment process allows to analyze information objects in the smart home system that are critical from the point of view of safety, to analyze risks and their effects on objects, and to suggest possible countermeasures to protect information objects and create a smart home system more safer.

#### Conclusions

As a result of the study, the architecture of a smart home was considered as a system consisting of three logical levels: perception, network and application level. A review of known cyber threats was conducted for each level. In particular, critical information objects in the smart home system, risk assessment criteria and cyber threat scenarios have been identified. The information security risks of the smart home system were assessed using the OCTAVE Allegro methodology for the information object that presents the information collected by the smart home sensors. Further research is the formation of a comprehensive risk assessment of information security of the smart home system and the implementation of the software system, which will automate the process of risk assessment not only for the smart home system, but also for other systems that implement the Internet of Things.

Table 4

Risk assessment for the information object «information collected by devices» $\mathbf{Z} \neq \mathfrak{A} \neq \mathfrak{A}$ Information objectInformation collected by devices

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	Area of concern (1) Actor Who will influence the is object creating a security (2) Means	ty threat?	h and lives of re e motion sensor loor locks and a hart home syster rs, which makes nd so on Intruder (hacke Hacking tools	sidents can be us larm sys n do not s it impo r, unscru	sed to determine tems can be used produce the abi ossible to detect pulous supplier o	the preser d to detern ility to per t such ris	nce of c mine w rceive t ks as t	occupants of then a smart the physical fire, floods,
	do for this? (3) Motive	st do this? What should they e protagonist gain from a	Financial benef		action of persona	l ambitior	15.	
	(4) The result		• Disclosure		• <b>D</b>	estruction	1	
		ed in the information object?				terruptio		
	(5) Safety requirement How will the security red object be violated?	<b>s</b> quirements of the information		on should	only be availabl	le to smart	t home	owners
	(6) Probability	of reproducing such an effect	• High	0	Medium	0	Low	
1 H		· · · · ·						
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